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Abstract 
The paper argues that the moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is unified by a 
complex conception of reason that imposes consistency norms of both rationality 
and reasonableness. Hobbes’s conceptions of rightness as reciprocity, and moral 
goodness as sociability belong to an original and attractive moral theory that is 
neither teleological nor classically deontological, nor as interpreters have variously 
argued, subjectivist, contractarian, egoist, or dependent on divine command. 
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Introduction  
More than fifty years ago K. C. Brown wrote “there is still persistent and drastic 
disagreement… about what [Hobbes] actually meant his theory to be in the 
first place,”(Brown 1965, p. x) and the situation with respect to Hobbes’s moral 
theory has, if anything, worsened since then. Today we have carefully argued 
interpretations by respectable scholars finding Hobbes to have no moral 
theory at all, but only a theory of long-run self-interest.2  Equally carefully 
argued interpretations take Hobbes to be a moral subjectivist,3  projectivist 
(Darwall, 2000), or prescriptivist (Holden, 2016), a moral contractarian 
(Gauthier, 1986), an ethical egoist (Gert, 2001),4 a rule egoist (Kavka, 1986), a 
strict deontologist prefiguring Kant (Taylor, 1938), or a virtue theorist (Ewin, 
1991; Boonin-Vail, 1994). We have interpretations according to which 
Hobbes’s moral theory is derived from empirical psychology,5 independent of 
psychological theory (Taylor 1938), or analytically derived from definitions of 
key concepts (McNeilly, 1968; Deigh, 1996; Lloyd, 2009). Moral norms are 
entirely conventional (Gauthier, 1986), or they depend on divine command.6 
The range of interpretive disagreement is staggering. 
It may be helpful to clarify what we are asking about when asking whether 
Hobbes has a moral theory. On one influential account, moral theory is the part of 
moral philosophy that studies substantive moral conceptions by specifying how their 
basic notions of rightness, goodness, and moral worth are arranged to form a 
distinctive moral structure, showing how they relate to our attitudes, and what 
conditions they must satisfy if they are to play their expected role in human life 
(Rawls, 1975, p. 286). So understood, a moral theory will provide an account of 
                                                          
2. Nagel 1959; Watkins 1973; Hampton 1986. For example, Nagel writes “genuine moral obligation plays no 
part at all in Leviathan” and a Hobbesian man “is susceptible only to selfish motivation and therefore is 
incapable of any action which could be clearly labelled moral. He might, in fact, be best described as a man 
without a moral sense,” 69, 74. 
3. Tuck 1989. Tuck variously ascribes to Hobbes three quite distinct theories; moral relativism, moral scepticism, and 
moral subjectivism, xxvi-xxvii. 
4. Gert takes Hobbes to hold that morality requires the pursuit of self-preservation and other elements of self-
interest, as “rationally required” ends.  
5. Strauss, 1965; Gauthier, 1969; Hampton, 1986; Shelton, 1992; Curley 1994; Kavka, 1986 sharply distinguishes 
Hobbes’s descriptive psychological theory from his normative moral theory but attempts to “base” the latter on 
the former. 
6. Martinich, 1992; Byron, 2015; Hood, 1964; Warrender, 1957, who writes that the laws of nature “have 
obligatory force only when regarded as the commands of God,” 252. 
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goodness and of rightness and of the priority relation between the two. It will also 
provide an ideal of moral character, an account of moral responsibility, and an 
account of how persons can typically be motivated to do what morality requires of 
them. Once these elements have been specified, it becomes possible to fruitfully 
address meta-questions about what sort of a theory – error, realist, constructivist, 
etc. – that theory is. 
1. Morality Requires Reciprocity 
Hobbes famously offers the familiar “law of the Gospel; whatsoever you 
require that others should do to you, that do ye to them” (Leviathan, 14.5)7 as 
the central principle of morality. He offers this reciprocity requirement in 
multiple formulations, positive and negative,8 in every version of his theory, 
and says it is the “core” or “sum” of the law of nature, that it “contains” all the 
law of nature, or that it just is the law of nature. It entails numerous behavioral 
requirements (including of gratitude, equity, justice, mutual accommodation) 
and prohibitions (including of arrogance, partiality, contumely, cruelty), but 
because every normal adult human is to be held responsible for observing 
them, “to leave all men inexcusable, they have been contracted into one easy 
sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity, and that is Do not that to 
another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself” (Leviathan, 15.35). 
The law of nature is the moral law, and the science of it – its casuistry and its 
derivation – is “the true moral philosophy” (Leviathan, 15.40). 
Hobbes grounds its claim on us in our status as rational creatures. “God 
himself, because He hath made men rational, hath enjoined the following law on 
them, and hath inscribed it in all hearts: that no one should do to another that 
which he would consider inequitable for the other to do unto him”(De Homine 14.5, 
emphasis added). Equity, Hobbes says, the “law of nature which commands every 
man to allow the same rights to others they would be allowed themselves . . . is the 
same which Moses sets down (Lev. XIX.18): Thou shalt love thy neighbour as 
thyself. And our Saviour calls it the sum of the moral law” (Rudiments 4.12); and 
this requirement “is the natural law, having its beginning with rational nature 
                                                          
7. 14.5. References to Leviathan and De Cive are by chapter and paragraph numbers. 
8. See Leviathan 14.5, 15.35, 26.13; De Cive 3.14, 4.12; Elements I.5.6, II.10.7 Hobbes does not differentiate 
between positive and negative formulations of the requirement to afford others reciprocal treatment. 
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itself” (Rudiments 17.8, emphasis added). Qua rational beings, men are subject to 
a reciprocity requirement. 
As these formulations of the natural law make plain, morality concerns our 
behavior toward others (those actions that may “redound to the harm or benefit of 
our neighbors”(Rudiments 2.1 note)) and our “manners,”(Elements I.5.1) which 
Hobbes defines as dispositions to behave toward others in a way that promotes 
harmony (virtues) or undermines it (vices). The reciprocity principle suggests a very 
simple, familiar test of moral permissibility: consider how you would react were you 
on the receiving end of the action you propose to perform, and if you would blame 
such treatment as being wrong, you may not permissibly so act (15.35, De Cive 3.26). 
Because the laws of nature are condensable into this one simple reciprocity 
principle, no one can plead ignorance as an excuse for immoral behavior (27.4). 
“The laws of nature are those we are bound to obey insofar as we are men” (OL 
26.1, emphasis added), and thus bind every competent adult, including sovereigns9 
and atheists.10 No one is above the natural law, and its claim on us does not depend 
on belief in the existence of God. “Only children and madmen are excused from 
offences against the law natural,” Hobbes insists (27.23, emphasis added). It 
follows that the duty to abide by the laws of nature does not depend on the 
individual’s having promised or covenanted to do so. Ordinary obligations do 
require an agent’s voluntary act of covenanting or vowing,11 whereas the laws of 
nature not only do not depend on covenant, but they constrain what obligations we 
can undertake by means of covenants. Hobbes explains, “a covenant, if lawful, 
binds by the force of natural law . . . if unlawful, bindeth not at all,”(14.33) and those 
who vow to do anything contrary to the law of nature “vow in vain” it being “unjust 
to pay such a vow”(14.23). The law of nature binds, not as a contractual obligation, 
but as a natural duty.12 
2. Moral Casuistry 
Hobbesian moral casuistry is a matter of syllogistically discharging the major 
                                                          
9. Sovereigns commit iniquity when they violate the law of nature. 18. 6 and OL 18.6. For discussion of the set 
of duties under the law of nature particular to sovereigns, see Lloyd 2009, 33–48. Only God may legitimately 
hold sovereigns to account for their violations of natural law. Elements II.9.1. 
10. “Unbelief is a rejection of [all of God’s laws] except the natural,” 26.40, emphasis added. 
11. 21.10 “there being no obligation on any man which ariseth not from some act of his own.” 
12. Additional support for this conclusion appears in Lloyd, 2017. 
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reciprocity premise by a minor premise specifying something we would blame 
others for doing, or for failing to do. Blame is a specific reactive attitude 
reflecting a belief that the action is wrong. For example, because I would blame 
others, who are my equals, for refusing to enter into a peace on equal terms 
with me when I am willing to do so with them, reciprocity requires that I must 
do so when they are willing. This reasoning yields the second law of nature. 
The application of this form of reasoning to establish the right of nature is 
particularly interesting. Because I would judge everyone to whom I own no 
special obligations unreasonable to blame me for doing what I sincerely 
believe necessary to save my own life, and for relying on my own judgment 
rather than theirs about what is necessary, I must reciprocally allow that they 
also do no wrong in doing whatever they conscientiously deem necessary to 
save their own lives. I must grant a universal right to all to act on their own 
judgment of what is needful for their own survival. The right of nature is thus 
not primitive, but is rather derived from the reciprocity requirement of the 
law of nature,13  and this fact explains why the right is limited to perceived 
needs of self-preservation. We would blame others for seriously harming us 
in pursuit of what they acknowledge to be trivial gains or superfluities. In 
general, we are inclined to blame others for every harm they do to us, so the 
general principle is that harming others is wrong. But because we would fault 
others for blaming us for harms we commit out of necessity or for self-
preservation, reciprocity also operates to carve out a set of exceptions to that 
no-harm principle. Far from positing unlimited moral license, Hobbes writes 
that “all infliction of harm on men is a violation of natural Law and a wrong 
against God” except only what is excused as being “done of necessity, or in 
pursuit of peace, or for self-preservation.”14 
The remnant of the right of nature retained in civil society in the form of the 
true liberties of subjects depends in the same way on the individual’s judgment that 
it would be unreasonable to fault her for not resisting what she sees as an urgent 
                                                          
13. Hobbes writes if “every man would grant the same liberty to another, which he desires for himself, as is 
commanded by the law of nature, that same natural state would return again, in which all men may by right do 
all things,” Rudiments 10.8. 
14. De Cive 3.27 note, emphasis added. Were these exceptions not allowed by reciprocity, every harmful act 
would be immoral, even causally necessitated accidents like bumping into another when the bus jolts. 
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threat to her survival. Those retained rights are nothing more than exemptions 
from moral blame for doing in extreme circumstances what cannot be approved in 
ordinary ones, namely disobeying the sovereign’s command. They are certainly not 
legally enforceable claim rights, nor exemptions from civil punishment, for though 
the subject acts blamelessly in refusing the sovereign’s command, the sovereign 
also acts within its authority in punishing the subject for disobeying. Even when it 
comes to determining whom we should obey, Hobbes implicitly appeals to 
reciprocity, writing, “for when we demand that our fellow citizens obey someone’s 
power for our good, we admit by that very demand that his power is legitimate” (De 
Cive 14.12.). We admit, that is, that we too ought to obey him, because what we 
demand of others we are required under natural law also to do. 
3. Reason as Consistency, Rightness as Reciprocity 
Hobbes speaks of the laws of nature as “theorems” of reason. But of what 
axiom are they theorems? Reason imposes a fundamental requirement of 
consistency. It is contrary to reason simultaneously to hold contradictory 
beliefs about the same proposition, and it is contrary to reason to hold 
contradictory reactive attitudes toward the same justifying consideration for 
an action. Hobbes calls it “absurd” for one to approve a consideration as 
justifying one’s own action while disapproving that very same consideration 
as justifying another’s relevantly similar action. A reason, for a person, is a 
consideration she takes to justify an action under a fixed description of that 
action; a consideration that she will offer to you but will not accept from you 
is not a reason, at least not coming from her. 
Hobbes consistently criticizes those who condemn in others what they approve 
in themselves. He finds it ironic that Cato should have such a reputation for 
wisdom, considering that with him “animosity should so prevail instead of 
judgment, and partiality instead of reason, that the very same thing which he 
thought just in his popular state, he should censure [that is, blame] as unjust in a 
monarchical” (Rudiments Epistle Dedicatory, emphases added). That a man “gives 
a different judgment of an action when he does it than when someone else does the 
very same thing [is among the] obvious signs that what moral Philosophers have 
written up to now has contributed nothing to the knowledge of truth” (De Cive 
Epistle Dedicatory). Hobbes insists that inconsistency in evaluative judgments, 
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reflecting inconsistency in our reactive attitudes, is contrary to reason, and so, 
reason requires reciprocity.  
Reciprocity is the standard for right action, and violation of it is always wrong. 
However, its theorems, which comprise the particular laws of nature requiring 
peace-seeking, justice, impartiality, etc., need not be observed in foro externo in the 
social circumstance that no one else is observing them and one’s unilateral 
compliance with them would “assist the wicked” in victimizing oneself (14.36, De 
Cive 3.27). This is an exemption approved by the reciprocity requirement 
rather than a suspension of the reciprocity requirement. We would blame those 
who blamed us for resisting damaging exploitation of our willingness to observe the 
laws of nature from those who will not reciprocally observe them, and so must allow 
that all permissibly resist such victimization. Reciprocity licenses only symmetrical 
behaviors, approving sociability toward those willing to be sociable, and the use of 
force and fraud against enemies in circumstances of war (14.4). “Reason,” Hobbes 
writes, “and the law of nature over and above all these particular laws, doth dictate 
this law in general” that we need only observe “those particular laws” when we do 
not expect to be harmed by “the neglect thereof in those toward whom we observe 
them”(De Corpore Politico I.4.10, emphasis added). Reciprocity, then, is an 
immutable requirement of reason that requires actual performance everywhere 
and always, even as it explains why theorem laws of nature mandating particular 
types of behavior sometimes bind only in the inner court of conscience. 
Not everything contrary to reason is wrongful, for mere errors of calculation, 
and failures to fit means to ends are contrary to reason. But contrariety to reason is 
necessary for moral wrongness – “we ought to judge those actions only wrong, 
which are repugnant to right reason” (De Cive 2.1)– and culpable fault (immorality) 
is a matter of being “blameable with reason” (De Cive 14.17). Blameworthiness, 
rather than mere incorrectness, characterizes wrongness; whatever is not wrong is 
permissible, blameless, and allowed as right (Elements 14.6, De Cive 1.7). Reason 
thus involves both rational requirements of consistency, such as that he who wills 
the end must will the means necessary to produce that end, and reasonable 
requirements of consistency, such as that one must allow to others whatever one 
requires for oneself. The reasonable requirement of reciprocity, which constrains 
pursuit of self-interest, is justified as a requirement of reason, but it is not justified 
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instrumentally by application of a rational means/ends principle. Reason imposes 
co-equal and independent requirements of reasonableness and rationality, neither 
derived from the other, and each mandating a kind of consistency.15 
4. Deriving the Laws of Nature 
Reason itself does not dictate ends. In order for there to be a universal moral 
duty to seek peace, each person must fault others for not seeking peace (and 
so be bound by reciprocity to do so herself). What, considering Hobbes’s 
insistence on the idiosyncratic diversity of the objects of our passions, 
reflecting differences in our bodily constitutions, upbringing, education, and 
experience (Leviathan Introduction. 3), could form a universal basis for 
faulting others’ unsociable behavior? One popular suggestion among 
interpreters has been a posited alpha desire in all people to avoid their own 
temporal bodily death, which desire is supposed to arise inexorably from 
biological processes. Hobbes’s position was more subtle. The desire for 
temporal bodily self-preservation is natural (De Cive Epistle Dedicatory) and 
blameless (De Cive 1.7), but often not dominant in socialized people. Hobbes 
recognized ambitious rebels, glory seekers, religious martyrs, gentlemen 
dueling for their honor, and many ordinary folk who wish to achieve salvation 
or to avoid damnation as caring more to achieve those ends than they do for 
their temporal bodily survival, and so as willing to risk, or sometimes even to 
sacrifice, their lives to satisfy their transcendent interests.16 Nor did he think 
all motivation is necessarily self-interested; all of one’s interests are interest of 
oneself, but they are not all interests in oneself – in one’s own health, wealth, 
reputation, or pleasure. Hobbes recognized desires of the self in things like the 
welfare of loved ones and the flourishing of causes.17 
There is, however, one universal, inescapable desire no human agent can fail to 
have. Agents must want the conditions necessary for achieving their ends to obtain. 
Agents desire not just particular objects, but the conditions for satisfying whatever 
                                                          
15. Contrary to the views of Gauthier 1969, Hampton 1986, and many others. Although Rawls 2007, 65–6 is 
correct to describe the laws of nature as reasonable principles, he errs in holding that in Hobbes “the grounds 
[sic] of the Reasonable is the Rational.” 
16. For the concept of a transcendent interest, and documentation of Hobbes’s appreciation of it, see Lloyd 
1992. 
17. For a complete discussion of this issue, see Slomp 2019.. 
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future desires they may have, Hobbes writing that “the object of a man’s desire is . 
. . to assure forever the way of his future desire”(11.1). This explains our perceived 
need to accumulate “power after power” (11.2). If we see that our ability to do 
whatever we from time to time may most want to do is impeded by a condition of 
universal war because of things like the interference of others and our insecure 
control of resources, we will necessarily “abhor” that condition. We will converge 
on the judgment that avoidance of that condition is “agreeable to reason in the 
actions of common life,” we will demand that other people do what is necessary to 
avoid that condition, and we will fault them for refusing to do so. 
Attempted derivations of the laws of nature based on the desire for self- 
preservation typically assume that peace is necessary for any individual’s self-
preservation, and that in order to achieve peace it is necessary that every 
individual follows the laws of nature. Yet, it is simply not true that peace 
requires every agent always to follow every law of nature; all peaceful states 
contain some ingrates, promise-breakers, and immodest and self-partial 
people, as Hobbes acknowledged. Nor is it true that others will follow the laws 
of nature only if one does so oneself.18 The reason that any given person should 
follow the laws of nature cannot be that his doing so is necessary to prevent 
the existence of general warfare. He is just not that important. What is true is 
that if no one follows the laws of nature, peace cannot be achieved. It is 
necessary for avoiding general warfare that some critical mass of humanity 
observes the laws of nature, and so, because each deems that good, each must 
demand that other people around herself should observe those laws. Then, by 
reciprocity, reason requires her to observe them herself toward those people. 
The reciprocity requirement of morality gives individuals no asymmetrical 
option of personal exemption; either they demand that everyone follow 
natural law or they exempt everyone else along with themselves. They cannot 
rationally do the latter. Thus the reason they should act as the laws of nature 
require is not that doing so is instrumentally necessary to achieve self-
preservation or any other particular end; it is rather that it is right (accords 
                                                          
18. It is not even true that unless I follow the laws of nature, I will be evicted from society into a state of nature. 
I might be fined or jailed, but more likely, I will join all those other people in society who sometimes act 
immorally but suffer no consequences at all. There is such a thing as successful wickedness, and it is not as rare 
as we might hope. 
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with reason) that they should do what they require others to do as necessary 
to achieving what they as rational agents must deem good. 
To ground the derivation of the particular laws of nature on contingent desires 
that individuals may or may not have would undermine the scientific status of 
Hobbes’s moral philosophy, which he advertises as its greatest virtue. A 
psychological minor premise must be imported into the derivation from the 
reciprocity rule of the law of nature to seek peace, but that premise is required by 
Hobbes’s method of proof to be a postulate of a necessary desire. It is not only not 
necessary that people most desire their bodily self-preservation, it is often flat out 
false. Hobbes denies that there is any particular finis ultimus or summum bonum 
for humans (11.1). It is, however, both true and necessary that we, qua rational 
agents desire that the conditions necessary for the effective exercise of our agency 
obtain. We must desire the ordered social environment that general adherence to 
the laws of nature creates, because without it we can expect to be crossed at every 
turn, and we want to assure forever the way to our future desire (11.1). It is bad 
enough that inescapable natural evils interfere with us – sickness and accidents, 
and natural disasters. We cannot want to heap man-made evils (so-called moral 
evils) like being victimized by murder, enslavement, and pillage on top of those 
natural impediments to our doing whatever it is we most want from time to time to 
do. We have to demand general adherence to those laws of nature that create a 
navigable space in which we reasoning agents can act. 
5. Goodness as Sociability 
In Leviathan Hobbes writes that “moral philosophy is nothing else but the 
science of what is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind,” 
(15.40) and that “good and evil are names that signify [indicate] our appetites 
and aversions. . . [concerning] what is conformable or disagreeable to reason 
in the actions of common life”(15.40). Names are marks or signs used for 
personal recall and for communication with others. These particular names, 
“good” and “evil,” in their moral sense apply to our sociable behavior – how 
we treat each other and how we organize our shared social environment. The 
standard requiring conformity to reason is objective insofar as it makes moral 
good and evil not reducible to the speaker’s attitudes; but deciding whether 
that standard has been met is a matter of judgment, and no single person’s 
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reason, nor any group’s reasoning, is guaranteed infallibly to track “right 
reason.” People frequently disagree about the justifiability of arrangements 
that mutually affect them, which fact Hobbes lists as one of the reasons men 
cannot live peacefully without government.19 In general,  
divers men differ… [in their judgment] of what is conformable, or 
disagreeable to reason in the actions of common life. Nay, the same 
man in divers times differs from himself, and one time praiseth (that 
is, calleth good) what another time he dispraiseth (and calleth evil); 
from whence arise disputes, controversy, and at last war (15.40). 
Even if people were conscientiously trying to judge what comports with reason 
in their common business, disagreement would remain because people’s appetites 
and aversions infect their use of the terms “good” and “evil,” and these passions 
differ widely across persons and even within persons over time (15.40). Hobbes 
observes that people tend to “call good” whatever they personally desire, approve, 
or will,20 regardless of whether their judgments track conformity to reason in the 
actions of common life. This is understandable, because we make evaluative 
judgments in other areas of life in which mere personal preference is an appropriate 
standard, and these may easily spill over into an area in which it is not. There is a 
common non-moral use of “good” and “bad” to pick out what is (un) pleasing, 
(un)desirable, or (not)useful to oneself without regard to sustaining society as 
reason directs. Hobbes observes that whatever a person wills “seems good” and is 
pleasant to her (Rudiments 1.2). 
People sometimes unwittingly substitute their personal tastes for 
standards of good and evil. Hobbes criticizes the “schools of the Grecians” as 
unprofitable precisely because “their moral philosophy is but a description of 
their own passions… they make the rules of good and bad by their own liking 
and disliking,” resulting in “the subversion of commonwealth.” 21  Further, 
people may purposely manipulate moral language in pursuit of personal gain; 
unlike sociable creatures that lack words, “men can represent to others that 
                                                          
19. Unlike humans, naturally sociable creatures “do not see, nor think they see, any fault in the administration 
of their common business; whereas among men there are very many that think themselves wiser, and abler to 
govern the public, better than the rest” (17.9). 
20. 6.7; Cf. De Cive 1.10 “whatever anyone wants seems good to him precisely because he wants it”. 
21. 46.11. See also De Cive 3.32 “whenever someone dislikes another person’s good action, he applies the name 
of some vice related to it; likewise wickedness that pleases is given the name of a virtue.” 
80   Interpreting Hobbes’s Moral Theory / S. A. Lloyd  
 
which is good in the likeness of evil, and evil in the likeness of good” (17.10, 
emphasis added). And of course, anyone may err in a judgment of what 
comports with reason in the actions of common life. We find then in Hobbes 
two uses of ‘good’: as revealing the speaker’s favor toward whatever is the 
object of her will, and to indicate her judgment that something conforms with 
what reason requires in the actions of common life (moral goodness). The first 
has no normative implication in Hobbes; on it the good is not something that 
ought to be pursued, for one may will a course of action which reason 
condemns, such as revenge, or rebellion. The second does have normative 
implications because it is linked to right reason, but we should expect 
widespread disagreement in those judgments of goodness. 
We are now in a position to consider the relation of the good to the right in 
Hobbes’s moral system. Goodness is not prior to, nor conceptually independent of, 
rightness. Goodness is conformity with reason’s requirement in the domain of 
sociability, that is in the actions of common life, and what reason requires in that 
domain is reciprocity, but reciprocity is the primary principle of rightness. To be 
blameless with reason, hence right, action must conform to the reciprocity 
principle. Thus, goodness cannot be characterized independently of rightness, let 
alone as prior to it. Just as the reasonable and the rational, so the right and the 
good, both proceed from and express reason. This does indeed preclude 
understanding Hobbes’s moral theory as teleological or consequentialist. 
6. Character and Virtue 
Hobbes distinguishes between the justice of an action and the justice of a 
person, explaining that refraining from all unjust actions is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for being a just person. The “virtue of manners” possessed by the 
just person involves a consistent concern to act justly, a specific set of reactive 
attitudes concerning injustice, and being motivated directly by considerations 
of justice. Hobbes takes justice to be one of the two central virtues, charity 
being the other, and it plays an important role in his argument for the 
immorality of political disobedience. There is, though, no reason to suppose 
he would not extend his distinction between the morality of actions and the 
morality of persons to cover cases other than justice, including modesty, 
gratitude, sociability, or equity. Action that conforms to the requirements of 
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natural law will be right action, but if the actor was not motivated by the 
rightness of the action but instead by fear of punishment or hope of gain, that 
action was no evidence of a good moral character. Conversely, a person 
motivated in the right way and with the right attitudes who sometimes slips 
up in action through error or weakness may still count as virtuous. In the 
English Leviathan Hobbes writes that a just or righteous man 
is he who taketh all the care he can that his actions may all be just; and 
an unjust man is he that neglecteth it. … a righteous man does not lose 
that title by one or a few unjust actions that proceed from a sudden 
passion or mistake of things or persons; nor does an unrighteous man 
lose his character for such actions as he does or forbears to do for fear, 
because his will is not framed by the justice, but by the apparent benefit 
of what he is to do (15.10). 
Here Hobbes seems to accept the Aristotelian view that “mistake of things or 
persons”– cases in which one simply does not realize what one is actually doing – 
do not count against one’s character, and suggests that neither may immoral 
actions done in the heat of passion. The latter view, however, seems not to be 
Hobbes’s considered position, for he elsewhere insists that we are to be held 
responsible for willingly doing things that may weaken our ability to do as natural 
law requires, as habitually indulging our passions may be expected to do22. He 
insists that during the period between learning a law (which in the case of the laws 
of nature coincides with the advent of reason) and performance of the violation, the 
person should have “rectified the irregularity” of his passions, and so heat of 
passion is no excuse (27.33). This more stringent standard is reflected in the 
corresponding passage of the Latin Leviathan. There he writes that when the terms 
‘just’ or ‘unjust’ are attributed to persons as opposed to actions they refer to a 
custom or habit, as a virtue or vice. Thus a man who has a constant will to give 
everyone what he has a right to, even if his actions have sometimes been unjust, is 
still just, provided he loves justice, himself condemns what he has done unjustly, 
even if he did it secretly, wishes he had not done it, and if he has done any harm, 
makes amends as far as he can. On the other hand, an unjust man is one who 
                                                          
22. Rudiments 3.25: Hobbes specifically condemns drunkenness on the ground that “he who knowingly or 
willingly doth aught whereby the rational faculty may be destroyed or weakened, he knowingly and willingly 
breaks the law of nature. For there is no difference between a man who performs not his duty, and him who 
does such things willingly as make it impossible for him to do it.” 
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neglects justice, even if, from fear or some other unworthy cause, he has never done 
injury to anyone (OL 15.10). 
Hobbes’s distinction here between worthy and unworthy causes of action is 
interesting. He specifies it in stark terms in the passage A. E. Taylor famously cited 
as evidence that Hobbes endorsed a strict deontology foreshadowing Kant’s:23 
Although a man should order all his actions so much as belongs to 
external obedience just as the law commands, but not for the law’s 
sake, but by reason of some punishment annexed to it, or out of vain 
glory; yet is he unjust (Rudiments 4.21). 
An action’s cause matters to the assessment of its moral worth and of the 
character of the agent. Hobbes suggests further that motivation by a sense of 
duty more reliably produces conformity to moral requirements than does fear 
of (uncertain) punishments in his response to the question “if men know not 
their duty, what is there that can force them to obey the laws? An army you 
will say. But what shall force the army?”(Behemoth 59, emphasis added) 
Presumably, nothing but an internal sense of duty. 
It is telling that Hobbes’s conception of the person of morally virtuous character 
departs from the traditional conception that included courage, fortitude, and 
temperance as among the cardinal virtues. He declines to afford those admitted 
excellences of character the status of moral virtues because, although they reliably 
redound to the benefit of the individual who has them, their effect on social 
harmony may be negative rather than positive. He writes that these are not virtues 
of citizens as citizens, but as persons, for these virtues are useful not so much to the 
state as they are to those individual persons who have them: 
For just as the state is not preserved save by the courage, prudence, and 
temperance of good citizens, so it is not destroyed save by the courage, 
prudence, and temperance of its enemies… [G]ood dispositions are 
those which are suitable for entering into civil society; and good 
manners (that is, moral virtues) are those whereby what was entered 
upon can be best preserved (De Homine 13.9) 
                                                          
23. Taylor 1938. Like Taylor, van Mill 2001 attributes to Hobbes a concern for autonomous agency, which, on 
van Mill’s account, requires reasoned control of the passions, excision of fear as a motive, and compliance with 
disinterested norms (the laws of nature) in pursuit of worthy ends within a coherent life plan. Van Mill sees the 
laws of nature as rules of thumb for securing the social conditions necessary for the exercise of rational 
autonomy. 
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Hobbes here confirms that morality is not aimed at nor justified by serving the 
narrow self-interest of the individual, but comprises norms that establish and 
maintain a desirable social environment. Attributes advancing personal gain will 
not be moral virtues unless they reliably advance social harmony, nor “should one 
demand that the courage and prudence of the private man, if useful only to himself, 
be praised or held as a virtue . . . by any other men whatsoever to whom these same 
are not useful” (De Homine 13.9). 
A virtuous person has the sensibilities, motivations, and habits that enable her 
to cooperate with others in sustaining a desirable social environment that should 
allow all to pursue their permissible ends without interference. This involves 
resisting her natural impulse to insist on her own private judgment as against 
others, holding her ego and prideful self-partiality in check, playing by the same set 
of rules she imposes on others, and doing so from a sense of duty rather than from 
fear of punishment. Hobbes illustrates his ideal of the virtuous person –whom he 
terms a “generous nature”– by his friend Sidney Godolphin. Godolphin had many 
personal excellences including native intelligence, eloquence, education, and 
breeding (all “powers” on Hobbes’s theory), but his moral virtue consisted in his 
combination of principled willingness to defer to the state’s command with his 
willingness to risk his life for his country.24 Hobbes concedes that generous natures 
are “rare” to find. Particularly rare is the judicious and courageous person who will 
forego acting on his personal conscience and defer, as a matter of principle, to what 
he may deem the erroneous conscience of his sovereign. 
7. Motive and Responsibility 
Motivation matters to moral character, but it plays a different and arguably 
more important role in Hobbes’s moral theory in determining ascriptions of 
responsibility. Hobbes concedes that right-thinking Christians will not and 
should not obey the sovereign’s command if doing so entails the sacrifice of 
their eternal prospects. Because Hobbes identifies the effort to obey the laws 
of nature as one of the two necessary conditions for salvation (Leviathan 43.4, 
43.5), it is crucial to his project of persuading his Christian readers to obey the 
                                                          
24. Leviathan. A Review and Conclusion.4: “I have known clearness of judgment and largeness of fancy, 
strength of reason and graceful elocution, a courage for the war and a fear for the laws, all eminently in one 
man, and that was my most noble and honored friend, Mr. Sidney Godolphin.” 
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sovereign that he shows how their duty to obey the laws of nature is 
compatible with their duty as subjects to defer to their sovereign’s commands 
to perform even actions that they believe to violate (and which may truly 
violate) the laws of nature. 
When subjects institute a sovereign by authorizing it and/or transferring their 
right of self-government, they agree not to hold it liable for any errors in judgment it 
may make and not to treat any harms it does them as actionable injustices.25 But they 
do not thereby become morally responsible for the actions it commands.26 Hobbes 
argues that when a subject does what her sovereign commands, despite her 
disapproval of the commanded action, only because she acknowledges her duty to 
obey the sovereign, responsibility for the subject’s obedient action belongs to the 
sovereign and not to the subject. He explains that the subject obeying his sovereign’s 
command to act is the cause of the action but not the author of the action: “The 
author of a deed is he who commands that it be done; the cause is he through whose 
powers it is done.”27 An action belongs to the person who commands it: 
[W]hat so ever a subject… is compelled to do in obedience to his 
sovereign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the 
laws of his country, that action is not his, but his sovereign’s.28 
Hobbes explains that when the subject obeys the sovereign’s command “under 
terror of his laws” to act wrongly, we “cannot from thence argue that he 
approveth it, but [only] that he doth it for fear, and that it is not his act, but 
the act of his sovereign” (45.22, emphasis added). 
The general principle Hobbes concludes is that “the external actions done in 
obedience to [laws], without the inward approbation, are the actions of the 
sovereign, and not of the subject, which is in that case but as an instrument, without 
                                                          
25. Based on the principle “no wrong is done to a consenting party”; De Cive 3.7, Leviathan 18.6. 
26. For elaboration of the argument I offer below, see Lloyd 2017. 
27. OL xlvi.22. In fact, Hobbes implies the stronger claim that one is author of an action only if he commands 
that it be done: people do many “things which God does not command, nor is therefore author of them,” L xxi.4, 
(emphasis added). This stronger claim implies that in a natural person “authoring” his own actions, his will is 
his command, so to speak, to himself. 
28. 80 L xlii.11, emphasis added. OL is even more explicit: “if someone is a subject, as Naaman was, and is 
compelled by his king to do something, whatever it is, in such a way that he does it not of his own accord, but 
in obedience to the laws of his country, it is not his act, nor is it to be imputed to him, but to the king, i.e., it is 
an act of the commonwealth, and is to be imputed to the laws; and that it is not he, but his king, who has 
denied Christ.” 
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any motion of his own at all; because God hath commanded [subjects] to obey them 
[the sovereign’s laws]” (42.106). 
An individual is morally responsible only for her own acts. Whether some deed 
she performed at her sovereign’s command is the sovereign’s act rather than her 
own act depends on her motive in performing it. If she disapproves of the action 
and does it only because her sovereign commands it, or only because she fears the 
sovereign’s punishment for disobedience, then the act is the sovereign’s and not 
hers. If instead she does the act because she personally judges it to be the right thing 
to do on the merits, the action is hers as well as the sovereign’s. Hobbes assigns 
responsibility for an action to the person whose “natural will” it expresses, writing 
that “to make a particular man unjust, which consisteth of a body and soul natural, 
there is required a natural and very will.”29 Subjects are artificial persons duty-
bound to act on whatever the public (sovereign) wills; but they are simultaneously 
natural persons with their own natural wills, upon which alone moral responsibility 
depends. Hobbes insists that only God can search hearts, or perceive the motives 
that decide questions of moral responsibility and moral virtue. 
8. Moral Motivation 
What can motivate moral behavior on Hobbes’s theory? Hobbes 
acknowledges that people could be motivated simply by their recognition that 
an action is morally required, that they could act, that is, “for the law’s sake”; 
but he finds this sort of internal motivation rare. If it were true that cheaters 
never win, narrow self-interest might suffice to motivate conformity with the 
laws of nature; but Hobbes concedes that the wicked do sometimes prosper in 
this life. Fear of divine punishment might motivate moral behavior, if such 
punishments were not so remote and so uncertain due to the prospect of 
divine forgiveness. Considering the benefits to others of our acting morally, 
our concern for the welfare of others, which Hobbes recognizes under the 
heading benevolence or charity, might motivate us; but most people’s 
benevolence is limited.30 
One tremendously powerful source of motivation that might be harnessed to 
                                                          
29. Elements II.2.4. See Lloyd 2016 for discussion of this position.  
30.And in any case, as Slomp 2019 shows, benevolence may equally motivate misguided persons to attempt to 
advance others’ interests by immoral means.  
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provide a more reliable support for moral action is the human desire to elicit others’ 
admiration and to avoid their contempt. Hobbes lays it down as a basic feature of 
human nature that each man cares very much that others should value him at least 
as highly as he values himself (13.5), which is a high bar to set because each also 
thinks himself wiser than most other men.31 He goes so far as to say that men’s 
voluntary encounters all seek either advantage or “reputation and honour among 
their companions” (De Cive 1.2). In a civil society, where the natural laws bind in 
foro externo and are determinately specified by civil law, what morality requires is 
public knowledge. Everyone knows that everyone else knows that it is contrary to 
reason to do oneself what one would condemn in others. Because we know that the 
lawbreaker must demand that we observe the laws of nature, and know he knows 
that reciprocity is required, we will rightly conclude that he, in breaking them, is 
not governed by his own reason. Whether his failure is due to hypocrisy, weakness 
of will, or a childish or bestial lack of reason, it gives us grounds to look down on 
him as inferior in reason to ourselves; and he can anticipate that we will do so. The 
motivation to conform to reason’s requirements (of rightness as reciprocity and 
goodness as sociability) might thus be provided by the natural human concern for 
status. Further, Hobbes’s insistence that “all the mind’s pleasure is either glory (or 
to have a good opinion of oneself), or refers to glory in the end,” (Rudiments 1.2) 
suggests that we desire the good opinion of others largely as evidence for a case we 
are trying to build in our own mind for our own value. The pleasure of self-
admiration is what we crave, and moral behavior may become an important 
requisite to enjoying that.32 
9. The Philosophical Status of Hobbes’s Moral Theory 
What should we conclude from this effort to gather Hobbes’s moral theory? 
First, he does have a recognizably moral theory. That theory is prescriptive, 
governs actions affecting the interests of other people, and imposes constraints 
on the pursuit of self-interest (as is typical of moral theories). In it the right 
depends on an idea of conformity with reason, where reason requires 
consistency in evaluative attitudes, expressed as a dictate of natural law. Moral 
                                                          
31. “such is the nature of men that they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves” 13.2. 
32. For development of the idea that the Hobbesian desire for glory, or self-admiration, may under certain 
social conditions be tapped to provide a motive for moral behavior see Lloyd 2019. 
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good and evil are determined by their conformity to that same reciprocity 
requirement of reason in the actions of common life, rather than by personal 
feelings of appetite or aversion. Hobbes’s theory does not reduce morality to 
personal profit or enlightened self-interest. Although morality never demands 
disastrous self-sacrifice from us, and conforming to its demands often does 
benefit us, the reciprocity constraint it imposes on us is neither justified in terms 
of self- interest, nor guaranteed never to cross it. The moral theory is thus not 
any form of ethical egoism, direct or indirect (rule). 
We also see that moral normativity does not depend on any facts about what 
God commands. The normativity of the laws of nature does not depend on their 
being literal law, and so does not depend on their being the commands of one 
whom we are formerly obligated to obey. That is not to say that moral norms are 
not also laws laid down by God to his subjects; some clearly are so in God’s 
prophetic kingdom, as Hobbes explicitly aims to demonstrate in every version of 
his political theory. The laws of nature would make an equally strong claim on us 
even if God did not command their observation, because they make a claim on us 
in virtue of our human nature as agents in pursuit of ends justified by reasons. That 
means that Hobbes’s is not essentially a divine command theory of morality. Our 
account also explains why the normativity of natural laws does not depend on their 
having been embedded into positive law by a civil sovereign, nor on our having 
entered into some enforceable contract to observe them. It follows that Hobbes is 
not a moral contractarian, and that it is not the case that all morality is 
conventional. The requirements of the laws of nature are not voluntary obligations, 
but natural duties. 
Hobbes’s theory is also not intuitionist, because the rules of morality are not 
presented entire to our minds and apprehended by some (mysterious) faculty of 
moral intuition. They are theorems, derived by reasoning from the content of the 
concept of ‘accordance with reason’ and the basic social conditions for agency, 
along with our own reactive attitudes. This makes Hobbes a constructivist about 
the content of practical reasons, and a constitutivist about the authority of practical 
reason.33 Hobbes’s moral theory does see the value of a virtuous character, but it is 
                                                          
33. 90 For insightful analysis of the moral theory herein described, see Noah Smith, “Review of Morality in the 
Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes,” Notre Dame Philosophical Review, 2010. 
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not a virtue ethic that identifies right action by what the good person would do, 
rather than by independently ascertained moral rules. To make some theory a 
virtue ethic it is not enough that it applauds and encourages the acquisition of 
virtuous character traits. What matters is what comes first, conceptually. In 
Hobbes, the reciprocity rule for right action comes first, and a virtuous person is 
one who is reliably motivated in the right way to do what the rule requires. 
A projectivist account of moral rightness according to which our judgments of 
moral right project those reactive attitudes through which we hold one another 
responsible, is ruled out because wrongness requires more than the mere fact of 
blaming; it requires that actions be “blameable with reason”; and as we have seen, 
reason requires that our reactive attitudes be consistent over a given action type. A 
projectivist account of goodness is similarly ruled out because goodness likewise 
involves conformity with reasonable standards. We have found that moral 
judgments enjoy a modest degree of objectivity, because even though they are 
always perspectival, that is, made from the agent’s perspective, only consistent sets 
of reactive attitudes can constitute moral judgments. That makes moral judgments 
more than mere projections of our actual reactive attitudes. It would be more 
accurate to say that moral judgments are picked out by idealized sets of consistent 
reactive attitudes of blaming, from the perspective of the agent. 
Hobbes developed an original and distinctive moral theory according to which 
perspectival applications of reciprocity establish moral norms for each individual. 
Happily, humans and their social circumstances are enough alike that there is 
substantial convergence among their norms, and complete convergence on a basic 
norm, reciprocity, which, he argues, entails a duty to defer any remaining moral 
disputes to a sovereign adjudicator. His is a provocative and productive idea that 
might bridge the gap between –or counteract the excesses of– the Kantian demand 
for universality, and the ethical egoist’s demand for exclusive attention to his own 
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